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Defense Transformation
and the 2005
Quadrennial Defense Review
RYAN HENRY

A

t the end of the Cold War, America entered a new and unfamiliar global
security environment. As the Department of Defense began to alter strategies and plans, it quickly became apparent that changes might have to be made
across the defense establishment. This led in 1993 to the Bottom-Up Review,
and, starting in 1997, to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process. As
the Department of Defense enters its third QDR this year, it is important to understand how central the QDR has become to the work of the department—and
how different this QDR is, compared to its predecessors.
With a yearly budget in excess of $400 billion, the Department of
Defense is perhaps the largest single bureaucracy in the world. Sheer size, as
well as vested interests and old ways of thinking, tend to give large bureaucracies an inertial resistance to change.
One of the tasks in the department this year is to ensure that the QDR
can instead be an engine of continued transformation. The need to transform
our military has elevated the role of the QDR from a tool of periodic refinement
to a fulcrum of transition to a post-9/11 world. This article will explore what the
QDR has become, how it is being processed, and what the Defense Department
hopes it will achieve.

The Modern History of US Defense Transformations
It is rare in history for institutions at the height of their success to transform themselves in anticipation of new challenges, but the armed forces of the
United States have done it before. Looking back at major defense transformations through our history, we can see that periods of concerted national effort to
transform the military have tracked a cyclical pattern: New challenges lead the
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defense establishment to develop new strategies, which in turn leads to investments in capabilities appropriate to that strategy.
In the 1930s, faced with the rise of aggressively expansionist regimes in Japan and Europe, the United States needed to prepare for the possibility of a new kind of conflict, and on a huge scale. We devised a strategy of
both mass and speed, one that emphasized destroying the enemy’s industrial
capacity as much as its forces in the field. Accordingly, the United States invested heavily in amphibious warfare, carrier-based air power, a strategic
bombing force, and an industrial base to support mechanized warfare. In the
nuclear age, faced with a global threat from the Soviet Union, we had to transform the military to integrate nuclear and conventional forces, dramatically
increasing its power and scope to maintain a strategy of containment and the
capability for massive retaliation. In the 1980s, America embarked on a series
of competitive strategies meant to expose fissures in the military establishment and strategic posture of the Soviet Union, in the hopes—successfully as
it turned out—of stressing them beyond their breaking point in their competition with the United States. In each of these cases, a new set of strategic problems led to new strategic thinking and then to sweeping transformation in the
structure, posture, weapon systems, and tactical doctrines of our military.
Since 9/11, the Defense Department has gained sufficient insight
into the new problem-set we face that the time is again ripe for new strategic
thinking and for transforming the force. The QDR provides a unique lever
with which to translate these insights into action.
When the Defense Department began its work under a new Administration nearly five years ago, President Bush charged it with preparing the
military for the challenges of the 21st century. This was to be no easy task: if
we knew anything about those challenges, it was that we didn’t know enough
about them. Because we can no longer make confident predictions about the
specific threats we will face, we must be able to provide for national defense
across a broad spectrum of threats. This has required a change in planning
methodology, using new tools for thinking about developing needed capabilities. Four years of experience have confirmed the need for these changes, and
have provided a better sense of the direction for the future.
The shock of 9/11 demonstrated how uncertain the world had become, and that day profoundly changed our perception of the immediacy and
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gravity of the risks we face. It also led to a global war on terror that began with a
campaign in a faraway land—Afghanistan—for which we had no contingency
plans. In Operation Enduring Freedom, we were able to develop and maintain a
flexible plan of battle even as our forces were deploying into the field. The tactical operations they conducted—many of them novel—demonstrated a capacity for adaptation and innovation at every level that became the key to success
for the operation as a whole. The flexible integration of Special Operations
Forces into every aspect of our regular combat operations in Afghanistan holds
particularly valuable lessons for the future.
A year later, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, we did have a contingency
plan on the shelf—which we reworked numerous times, taking into account
shifting political, strategic, operational, and tactical circumstances. Strategists were able to develop a highly adaptable and dynamic plan, with major
changes effected up to the week of the operation. In the course of that campaign the entire department saw, perhaps more than ever, the value of
jointness. We learned how small special operating forces can be leveraged to
control large areas of territory. We began to exercise the leverage-value of
network-centric warfare. In these and other areas, emerging tip-of-the-spear
technologies, tactics, and concepts proved to be valuable force-multipliers.
Like Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom represented another milestone in the
evolution of our military, replete with lessons for the future.
Under Secretary Rumsfeld’s leadership, the senior leaders in the Defense Department have worked hard to absorb these lessons. In the Senior
Leadership Review Group (SLRG),1 the Secretary has formed a cohesive leadership team that works together week-in and week-out. Stability in this DOD
enterprise-wide “corporate board of directors” over the years has been an important part of maintaining a productive and effective process. The SLRG balances bottom-up analysis with top-down senior leader insight to integrate their
experience across a spectrum of far-flung defense activities. This integration at
the top is critical for our ability to translate lessons learned into beneficial
changes throughout the organization. It also will be critical to leveraging the
work of the QDR into fundamental advances in transformation.

The 2005 QDR:
Matching Process to Principles and Lessons Learned
The history of defense transformations, and the experience of previous QDRs, suggest a series of guiding principles for maximizing the transformational value of the 2005 QDR.
The first is to foster a free yet structured competition of ideas in the
deliberations of the department. An important part of achieving that is to try
to create a broad discussion within and among the different communities that
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have interests and equities in the work of the department, including the various organs of our own government, foreign governments, and scholars at policy institutes and throughout the country. There is also an effort to reach out to
the public and to industry leaders. All these communities have valuable ideas
to contribute to an informed debate, and we will do what we can to absorb
them into our thinking.
A crucial point of departure for us was to define the capabilities the
nation needs without regard to how those capabilities should be resourced, or
even whether they belong in DOD. To be sure, a key task of the QDR is to
make sure that our strategies and capabilities are adequately resourced. Accordingly, as the QDR progresses, the department will recommend options
for resourcing, including tradeoffs. We can overcome neither hard choices
nor planning challenges simply by assuming that DOD’s top line will continue to rise. The aftermath of 9/11 and the resulting Global War on Terrorism
have obviously already led to a significant bill for the American taxpayer. A
constrained top line requires us to take a balanced and realistic approach to
risk management, and all the more so since we wouldn’t be able to reduce the
security risk to zero even with an infinite budget. We have to be able to manage the range of risks effectively across the spectrum of capabilities, balancing near-term operational and force-management demands with longer-term
future capability and institutional opportunities.
Some have spoken of a “rolling QDR.” The experience of past QDRs
teaches us that many important decisions will have to be made outside the
time frame of the formal QDR process. We enter the 2005 QDR with the benefits of a new National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy2 and a
variety of studies and insights that have been developed over the past few
years. These inputs influenced thinking and decisionmaking early in the process, and they will continue to be of value throughout the life of the QDR.
Other issues may not be ripe for decision in February 2006 when the
QDR is transmitted to Congress, so it may be appropriate to develop work
plans and decision roadmaps that would go on past the formal QDR process. In
the past, major transformational efforts, such as the Global Defense Posture
changes, were developed after the QDR process was finished. But the seeds
were planted in the QDR. So rather than constrain everything in a single point
in time, and try to encapsulate all the major decisions in a single program, it
may be better to contemplate a review that extends beyond the time frame of
the formal QDR, and which changes not just the thinking in the Pentagon but
also the follow-on decisions throughout the defense establishment.
Another lesson learned is that the more formalized the structures
that build up around the QDR, especially within individual stovepipes where
programs are advocated, the more inertia and zero-sum resistance to change
8
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sets in. Proponents for programs in specific stovepipes may become defensive. This can in turn cause certain aspects of the QDR to become a frictionfilled process, making it difficult to move forward across a broad front.
Rather than a process where a lot of analysis is done and issues are
channeled up their respective stovepipes for senior leaders to make decisions
on, there has been a move to a more integrated, enterprise-wide review that
benefits from the hands-on involvement of senior leadership throughout the
process. One critical present asset is a leadership team at the top that is willing
to lead and that has worked together for four years.
There is a need for the process to be as open and transparent as possible. We have worked hard to achieve a high degree of transparency, trying to
ensure that the services, combatant commands, and the various components
of the department are engaged at each step in the QDR.
Defining the “Terms of Reference” (the Secretary’s guidance for the
scope and conduct of the QDR) as carefully as possible was critical in putting
the QDR on a proper vector. In defining the Terms of Reference, Secretary
Rumsfeld encouraged his leadership team to think “outside the box.” We
strive to achieve that. Innovative answers spawn best from bold questions and
a climate of leadership that embraces change.
We have found that in terms of the level of change we were looking
for, the more focused the issues addressed in the QDR, the greater the chance
of developing lasting and innovative approaches. There may be a desire to
change a thousand things, but the QDR process and the multiplicity of demands on the senior leaders’ time gives us the capacity to look only at finite
numbers of proposed changes in-depth. Focusing on points of leverage to effect major changes is more valuable in the long run than getting lots of minor
changes across the whole system.
Finally, moving the QDR final report from September 2005 to February 2006 allows for a more logical alignment of the QDR with the programming and budgeting process. This allows us to develop capabilities and
guidance within the QDR, and then move quickly into the normal system for
specific budget and programmatic decisions.

A Decade of Evolution in Strategy
The QDR has changed dramatically, not merely because experience
offers valuable lessons, but even more because the importance of periodic review as a tool of transformation in our strategies and capabilities has grown
exponentially since the end of the Cold War. Of course 9/11 made the imperative of transformation all the more urgent.
In 1993, the desire for a peace dividend after the collapse of the
Soviet Union was a key motivation for the Bottom-Up Review. Carrying
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with it some of the baggage of a Cold War mentality, the department focused basically on the two places where it might have to fight major theater
wars (MTWs) against medium-sized powers. It made the capability to fight
two such wars simultaneously our highest priority, assuming that lesser
contingencies could be dealt with from the pool of its MTW capabilities,
and that there was time enough to deal with the rise of any future strategic
competitor.
That thinking still largely guided the department in the 1997 QDR,
but it was informed by our experience in Somalia and Bosnia, and by what we
saw in the horrors of the Rwandan genocide. We realized that we might need
certain capabilities not relevant to the MTW context if we were to be prepared
to deal with “lesser contingencies” that tended to manifest in unexpected
places and in unexpected ways. The department embarked on an effort to focus much more on these lesser contingencies, an effort that it remains vitally
engaged in to this day.
It is a tragic irony that when the current Administration undertook its
first QDR in 2001, the deadline for submitting its report to Congress was
early September. On 11 September itself, the QDR report was in final form.
All the substantive work of the 2001 QDR, which took place in the months
leading up to the attacks of that fateful day, was based on thinking that proved
tragically prescient.
One salient aspect of that QDR was that, as a policy document, it began with a degree of humility. As Secretary Rumsfeld insisted from the first,
the future is uncertain. We can’t predict it. We have to be ready for asymmetric attacks, and we can’t know how or where they will happen.
In the course of the 2001 QDR—even before 9/11—the department
came to the conviction that even with limited resources, it had to have effective
capabilities across a very broad spectrum. This in turn led to a richer forceplanning construct than in the past. It was called “One-Four-Two-One,” and
calls for accomplishing several things:
l Defend the homeland. (One)
l Operate effectively in four strategic areas: Europe, Northeast
Asia, the East Asian Littoral, and the Middle-East and Southwest
Asia. (Four)
l Fight two major combat operations nearly simultaneously, and
swiftly defeat3 our adversaries in each theater. (Two)
4
l Win decisively in one of the two major operations, at the direction
of the President—including, if necessary, regime change. (One)
On the capabilities side, the 2001 QDR continued to increase the department’s emphasis on lesser contingencies. But it also looked past the twoMTW scenario to the capabilities that we would need to handle asymmetric
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Parameters

threats posed by rising state competitors, such as information operations and
ballistic or cruise missile attacks.
Going into the 2005 QDR, the department’s focus on scenarios other
than the two MTWs continues to increase. The reason is simple: As we saw in
Operation Desert Storm and in the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, the traditional major combat operation is what we do best. We are
currently stronger than the foreseeable adversaries we would have to fight in
this kind of war. But the situations that will require the use of our military in
the future are not likely to be solely traditional. We still have much work
ahead to be adequately postured across the full range of capabilities necessary to deal with an unpredictable variety of challenges.
In the past four years we have had to deal with a wide variety of
“lesser contingencies,” from post-conflict stability operations in Afghanistan
and current counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, to emergency response situations in Liberia and Haiti. The Indian Ocean tsunami was a classic example
of an unexpected lesser contingency. The relief operation we conducted
through partner cooperation and an innovative use of our capabilities may
have saved tens of thousands of lives in the weeks following the disaster.
Those operations have demonstrated the need to build many kinds of unique
capabilities into the lesser contingency end of the spectrum. In this sense, irregular operations have become a great concern, along with preventing and
protecting against catastrophic contingencies.
At the other end of the spectrum, there is a need to train our sights on
the horizon, preparing for the challenges that may arise from future strategic
competitors. Even where competitors can challenge America head-on, the military conflicts of the future are not likely to consist of traditional state-on-state
symmetric warfare. We have to invest in capabilities to deal with the unexpected and the asymmetric in those situations as well.

New Tools: Capabilities-Based Planning
To explore and fully exploit the department’s capacity for change at all
levels, we have worked hard to devise new ways of thinking about issues and
problems. We have developed a valuable new set of transformational programs
and conceptual tools and built them into the analytical process. These programs
and concepts revolve around what we call “capabilities-based planning.”
Prior to the advent of capabilities-based planning, our planning process focused on specific threats that seemed predefined and predetermined.
During the Cold War, we faced a single predictable strategic adversary. This
led us to develop a threat-based planning system, in which we could project the
Soviet threat, where it was going to be in the future, and how we could posture
ourselves to deal with it. Moreover, we could plan decades in advance, because
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both their military capabilities and ours developed along linear and more or
less stable tracks.
The essentially predictive and threat-based planning system used by
the department during the latter half of the Cold War had been brought in by
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara after ten years of developmental
work at the RAND Corporation. This same planning system, born in the
1950s, was still the basis of strategy, budgeting, and programming in 2001.
When he arrived at the Pentagon for his current stint, Secretary
Rumsfeld recognized the need for change. He understood that the world of
the 1950s was not the world we live in now. Uncertainty defines the strategic
and operational environment today. We can’t tell where the next threats will
come from or when they will materialize. A planning system based on the prediction of specific threats can no longer adequately address the spectrum of
feasible threats to our society. In order to be able to respond quickly to the unexpected, decisionmakers will need a broad range of options. While we no
longer can predict specific threats—the what, when, or how—we have clear
indications that our security will be challenged in the coming decades. So
rather than focus on specific threats, we focus on capabilities.
In order to understand what is meant by “capabilities-based planning,” it is first of all necessary to grasp what we mean by “capability.” According to the department’s working definition, “capability” is the ability to
achieve desired operational effects under specified standards and conditions
through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks. For purposes of the QDR, a capability is not a platform or an asset. It’s the ability to
achieve a desired effect in the battle-space.
We achieve those effects according to given standards and under
given conditions. Standards depend on a few basic factors:
l What are the scale aspects of the desired effect (size, intensity)?
l What are the temporal aspects of the desired effect (latency, duration, time-phased application)?
l What are the observability aspects of the desired effects (detection,
attribution)?
l What are the spatial aspects of the desired effects (distance, area)?
To understand the conditions under which we will have to operate, we
need to understand the operational environment. What environment are we going into? Is it an urban setting? What are the terrain, vegetation, or weather conditions? Are conditions permissive, or are there significant anti-access factors?
This is the basic terminology of the language we are developing to
carry out the QDR. Notice that not a single weapon system has been mentioned.
Our first task is to determine conceptually what capabilities we need: what we
need to be able to do. We will then apply the normal decisionmaking process—
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QDR Strategic Environment
Irregular

Catastrophic

Non-state and state actors employing
unconventional methods to counter
stronger state opponents. (erode our
power)

Terrorist or rogue state employment of
WMD or methods producing WMD-like
effects against American interests.
(paralyze our power)

Examples: terrorism, insurgency, civil
war, and emerging concepts like
“unrestricted warfare”

Examples: attack on homeland,
global markets, or key ally that would
generate a state of shock and preclude
normal behavior

Likelihood: very high; strategy of the
weak

Likelihood: moderate and increasing

Traditional

Disruptive

States employing military forces in
well-known forms of military
competition and conflict. (challenge
our power)

Competitors employing technology or
methods that might counter or cancel
our current military advantages.
(capsize our power)

Examples: conventional air, sea, and
land forces, and nuclear forces of
established nuclear powers

Examples: technological—bio, cyber,
or space war, ultra-miniaturization,
directed-energy, other—diplomatic
blackmail, cultural or economic war

Likelihood: currently decreasing due
to historic capability-overmatch and
expanding qualitative lead

Likelihood: low, but time works against
the United States

Figure 1. Types of Challenges in the QDR Strategic Environment.

the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution within the Pentagon—to
translate this capabilities guidance into decisions on specific issues.

Strategic Challenges in the 21st Century
The QDR aims to put in place a capabilities-based approach to a
spectrum of challenges. Figure 1 has been used for discussion purposes rather
than specific decisions, but it is helpful in understanding an important part of
the vocabulary that we use in the QDR. Here we think about the kinds of challenges that make up the strategic environment for the 2005 QDR. The purposes of this concept-matrix are to have a frame of reference, to open up our
intellectual aperture, and to be able to appreciate the spectrum of challenges
facing us. In this matrix, we consider, along the vertical axis, different sorts of
challenges according to their likelihood. Along the horizontal axis, we consider challenges according to our vulnerability to them.
The US military of today is the dominant world power when it comes
to traditional challenges: state-on-state warfare with mass-on-mass conflict
in a regularized battlespace—the classic competition of firepower and maWinter 2005-06
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neuver. In the course of investing heavily in the capabilities to meet traditional challenges, and as successive generations of combatant commanders
have absorbed lessons from the battlefield and honed their skills, we have become the preeminent asymmetrical player in this kind of warfare.
But without transformation this probably will not be true for many
security challenges that will arise in a post-9/11 world, where nontraditional
challenges will increase in frequency and importance. In those contexts, we
currently don’t have the same comfort level, and we don’t have the same experience base. Different skill-sets and capabilities, and a much higher level of
integration within the US government, with host governments, and with
nongovernmental organizations, will be needed to deal effectively with many
of these nontraditional challenges.
Weak states and non-state actors more commonly employ irregular
methods, such as terrorism and insurgency, to challenge strong state opponents. Irregular challengers may take a long-term approach, seeking to impose high human, material, and political costs on the United States to
influence its behavior. Examples of appropriate ways of responding to irregular challenges include stability operations, “winning hearts and minds,” and
giving the combatant commanders civic building resources rather than bullets to win the peace. Faced with irregular challenges, we think of military
victory not in terms of security alone, or even principally, but also in such
terms as essential services, rule of law, market-based economies, representative government, and civic capital.
We think of catastrophic attacks as those that instantaneously result
in unacceptable levels of destruction to life and property. The attacks on 9/11
are the prime example. The threat of a ballistic missile attack, especially one
employing WMD, is another. Catastrophic attacks, especially by terrorists,
may seek to generate a state of shock to effectively paralyze our national
power and our way of life. Given the potential harm of catastrophic threats,
we concentrate on those capabilities that will dissuade others from acquiring
catastrophic capabilities in the first place, deter their use if that fails, and destroy them before they can be used if necessary.
Finally, disruptive challenges are those that come from breakthrough technological advances and similar developments that upset a critical strategic balance. We need to understand the world that is taking shape
around us, and we need to keep an eye on the future. For example, what if
another nation had developed stealth technology? This would have put our
nation at an unacceptable military disadvantage for the past two decades.
So we ask ourselves: In what other areas do we need to look generations
ahead in capability to make sure that we don’t suddenly find ourselves at
a threatening disadvantage? Examples include information technology,
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extreme miniaturization in microelectro-mechanical systems, directed energy and genetically-engineered biological systems, and so forth. There’s a
range of areas where we need to ensure that we remain the best in the world.
And here we rely more than anything on the research and development capabilities of the country as a whole—again, not exclusively or even principally
a DOD function.
Rather than focus on one specific threat, capabilities-based planning
asks whether we are structured to deal with unexpected events across this
whole range of challenges, understanding that many situations will present us
with one or more of them simultaneously. We have a force that was built for a
traditional operational environment. A key question is: How can we adapt
what we have now to be able to cover the other sorts of challenges?

Results of the QDR
The QDR final report will go to Congress with the budget submission in February 2006. It will have strategic planning guidance and will suggest a capabilities mix that will allow us to achieve our objectives.
The specific outputs that we expect to be associated with the QDR
include an independent risk assessment by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, so that Congress can have the benefit of his military advice. There also
may be follow-on execution roadmaps for any issues that are not ripe for decision when the QDR is released. Finally, the services will have their individual
programs that they will develop from the QDR.
With the increasingly crucial role of the QDR, it has become more
important to understand what it is and how it works. In essence, the QDR
is the basic vehicle for our effort to move the Defense Department into the
21st century. The QDR will be vital for posturing our forces correctly to win
the war on terror, while preparing for more distant challenges. It will lay
the groundwork for the military of the future, so that wherever, whenever,
and however the challenges of the 21st century arise, our armed forces will
be ready.
NOTES
1. The SLRG includes the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman and
Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the three service Secretaries, the four service Chiefs, and the five
Undersecretaries of Defense.
2. The new National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy were made public in March 2005,
and are available, respectively, at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf and http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf.
3. As explained in the March 2005 National Defense Strategy, “swift defeat” entails achieving a circumscribed set of operational or strategic objectives, and contemplates a range of military activities from stability
operations to major combat.
4. By “win decisively” we mean the complete achievement of a fundamental strategic objective with enduring results.
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